September 02, 2008
eBay Cracks Down on Cookie Stuffing--eBay v. Digital Point Solutions
By Eric Goldman
eBay, Inc. v. Digital Point Solutions, No. 5:08-cv-04052-PVT (N.D. Cal. complaint filed Aug. 25, 2008)
It is exceedingly rare for marketers to sue affiliates who are trying to game their affiliate programs. I'm sure there have been other lawsuits, but frankly I'm drawing a blank. (The only relevant precedent that came to mind was Google's tepid enforcement actions in 2004/2005 against click frauders--see Google v. Auction Experts and US v. Bradley). [Update: A reader reminded me of Land's End v. Remy, which is an on-point precedent.] The more typical remedy when commission fraud is taking place is to cancel any unpaid commissions and write off the rest as a cost of doing business (or an uncollectible painful lesson). But if someone gamed the system big--I mean, really big--maybe it would be worth hiring fancy and very high-priced counsel to go see what they might be able to retrieve...
eBay isn't saying how much it got taken for by the defendants in the case. The complaint was conspicuously silent on that juicy detail. However, the amount appears to be enough that eBay hired the premium law firm O'Melveny & Myers for a glorified collections effort. Either that, or eBay has decided to send a remarkably expensive message to other potential fraudsters.
The complaint alleges that the defendants engaged in a cookie stuffing campaign to hijack commissions through Commission Junction. Cookie stuffing occurs when a fraudster places a cookie on a third party computer that will cause the fraudster to get paid a commission that the fraudster didn't earn legitimately by doing the things that the marketer wanted to pay for. In this case, eBay alleges that the defendants used a clever technical exploit to put cookies on users' computers even though the users had not seen the requisite ads. The complaint also alleges that the defendants deployed some tricks to cover their tracks, like deliberately not cookie-ing computers in San Jose and Santa Barbara, the homes of eBay and Commission Junction respectively, to keep employees of those companies from spotting the marauding cookies.
If in fact the defendants engaged in cookie stuffing, I hope eBay nails them. However, I must say that some of eBay's legal arguments made me nervous. eBay's alleged causes of action include:
* CFAA (18 USC 1030). The allegation is that presenting a bogus cookie to eBay's servers was a misuse of the servers. Hmm...
* fraud. Similarly, the allegation is that the defendants caused web users to make a misrepresentation to eBay's servers by presenting a bogus cookie. Hmm again...
* CA Penal Code 502. There are very few cases interpreting 502, which isn't necessarily a bad thing because the statute is so broadly over-inclusive that everyone violates it routinely. Here, it looks like the lawyers weren't quite sure how to fit cookie stuffing into the statute. Take a look at para. 60 and let me know if you agree that this is an odd pleading.
* a civil RICO conspiracy claim. Given that eBay is being sued for RICO claims in the Mazur case (and, I'm sure, others), I would think eBay would want to avoid building new legal precedent that could be applied against them in other cases.
Reading the list of causes of action, I was surprised that there wasn't a more squarely applicable cause of action that governed cookie stuffing (however, I will confess, none came to mind as I drafted this post). Maybe this is due to the fact that eBay rather than Commission Junction is the plaintiff. If there isn't a better cause of action, then perhaps there is a hole in the law. However, I'm keeping my fingers crossed that a judge won't bastardize existing legal doctrines to plug it.
Posted by Eric at 09:23 AM Permalink | Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Privacy/Security | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version
September 01, 2008
Io v. Veoh Comments--a Terrific 512(c) Defense-Side Win
By Eric Goldman
IO Group v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 5:2006cv03926 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2008)
We spend so much time thinking about and debating 17 USC 512(c) that it's easy to lose sight of how few cases really interpret the statute. As a result, a clean and thorough opinion like this one makes a significant contribution to the precedent and teaches us a lot.
There are two architectural features of this ruling that make it particularly defense-favorable. First, the question of whether 512 trumps secondary liability or secondary liability trumps 512 is one of the most important frontiers in online copyright law because the statute is inherently ambiguous on this key point, and the cases have been erratic on this topic. Here, the court doesn't dwell on the issue and instead assumes (without any real discussion) that 512 trumps secondary liability. As a result, the court dismisses the case without ever reaching the plaintiff's prima facie case; meaning that even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie secondary infringement, Veoh still wins. If the court in Viacom v. YouTube reaches the same conclusion, then YouTube will win.
Second, Veoh took a number of steps to suppress user-caused copyright infringement, including some steps that were not required to satisfy 512(c). The court recognizes that it's impossible to eliminate user-committed copyright infringement but instead rewards Veoh for trying so hard. As the court says, "far from encouraging copyright infringement, Veoh has a strong DMCA policy, takes active steps to limit incidents of infringement on its website and works diligently to keep unauthorized works off its website." In this respect, the opinion reminded me of the Tiffany v. eBay ruling, where that court also lauded eBay for going beyond what the law required and excusing the infringement that slipped through the cracks. I think these two opinions put a huge exclamation mark to reject the notion that courts will only tolerate passive conduits (who do nothing to police their network) or perfect editorial control, with no middle ground for courts to excuse omissions by good faith actors. As with my first point, if the Viacom court adopts this philosophy, then YouTube will win.
A few other noteworthy aspects of this ruling:
* a website's failure to prevent terminated users from re-registering under alternative credentials does not preclude 512(c)
* 512(c) is not lost even if employees spot-check user submissions after publication and make minor edits to the metadata
* 512(c) still applies even if the website automatically extracts some metadata (in this case, some still previews of the video) and uses that metadata for promotional purposes. 512(c) even applied to the screenshots.
* The court rejects Io's argument that Veoh should change its business operations to do a better job of infringement suppression. The court recaps Io's argument as:
plaintiff contends that, if Veoh cannot prevent infringement on its site given the current volume of its business, then Veoh should be required to either hire more employees or to decrease its operations and limit its business to a manageable number of users (whatever that number might be). Its not-so-subtle suggestion is that, if Veoh cannot prevent infringement from ever occurring, then it should not be allowed to exist.
This change-your-business argument is popular among copyright plaintiffs, but the court emphatically rejects it:
Declining to change business operations is not the same as declining to exercise a right and ability to control infringing activity...Moreover, as discussed above, the DMCA does not require service providers to deal with infringers in a particular way...Further, plaintiff’s suggestion that Veoh must be required to reduce or limit its business operations is contrary to one of the stated goals of the DMCA. The DMCA was intended to facilitate the growth of electronic commerce, not squelch it.
While this ruling is very good news for the defense, there are plenty of reasons why it may not portend a similar result in the Viacom v. YouTube lawsuit, including:
* different courts (9th Cir. v. 2d Cir.). In particular, the Veoh court makes numerous references to Ninth Circuit precedent, and the Viacom court could simply say that Second Circuit law is different
* Io did not send any 512(c)(3) notices before suing. Viacom did. This is significant because the Io judge had little reason to be sympathetic to Io if they didn't take advantage of the non-litigation recourse mechanism specified in the statute. Then again, the Viacom court could simply expect Viacom to continue using the 512(c)(3) mechanism as well rather than looking for a court-imposed workaround.
* The Io court notes that the user-uploaded videos did not have a copyright notice in them. I'm sure Viacom can find examples where its copyright notice was included in the uploaded videos.
* Io is a pornographer. Their copyrights are as good as anyone else's, but courts might feel less sympathy towards pornographers.
* Veoh had gotten out of the porn business, and this mooted the injunction. However, Viacom could get an injunction against YouTube with significant bite. Most people misassume that 512(c) eliminates all liability for user-caused copyright infringement, but it only eliminates damages and limits the scope of injunctive relief in 512(j)--but a court can still issue an injunction. 512(j) is, as far as I know, not been litigated, and frankly I don't understand all of its provisions. But the bottom line is that an injunction is possible in the Viacom lawsuit even if 512(c) applies, and the Io ruling doesn't shed any light on that possibility.
Despite all this, YouTube has to be heartened by this ruling.
One final point: this is such a nice clean discussion about 512(c) that it may be a useful pedagogical tool. As a result, I am considering adding it to my Cyberspace Law reader in the future.
Posted by Eric at 09:54 PM Permalink | Copyright , Derivative Liability | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version
August 28, 2008
SEC Proposes that Companies Should Be Liable for Content Linked from the Company's Website
By Eric Goldman
[Note: I haven't had a chance to blog the Veoh case--coming soon!]
The Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) is proposing an interesting policy with respect to a securities issuer linking to discussions about it. See pages 31-37 of this document. Effectively, the SEC is proposing that a securities issuer can be liable for any misstatements on linked pages if "the context of the hyperlink and the hyperlinked information together create a reasonable inference that the company has approved or endorsed the hyperlinked information." The SEC's discussion about linking also has some interesting and largely exceptionalist discussion about the ontological meaning of a link.
At minimum, the SEC's proposed position may create a fascinating doctrinal clash with 47 USC 230, which seems to preempt any liability for content on third party websites--even if the linker "endorses" the linked content, and even if the SEC says otherwise (unless the SEC makes it part of federal criminal law, which is excluded from 230's immunization). If anyone is interested in working with me to submit a comment to the SEC (due Nov. 5) to explain why 47 USC 230 may preclude the SEC's approach, let me know.
This proposal raises an even broader issue how 47 USC 230 overlays on securities laws generally. I can't really think of a defendant who has litigated 230 as a defense to securities fraud claims, but it seems like a tenable defense for any online securities marketing done by third parties--a result which might wreak havoc on existing secondary doctrines of civil liability for securities fraud. This looks like an excellent but complicated paper topic.
UPDATE: James Grimmelmann takes exception to my reference of the SEC's policies as exceptionalist. I didn't build out the concept in this brief blog post, but I am thinking about making it part of the comments to the SEC, so I'm planning to elaborate on why I think it's exceptionalist soon.
Posted by Eric at 06:10 PM Permalink | Derivative Liability , Marketing | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version
August 27, 2008
7Search Sues McAfee For Red Flagging It
By Eric Goldman
7Search.com v. McAfee, Inc., 1:2008cv04831 (N.D. Ill. complaint filed Aug. 25, 2008). The Justia page.
I don't have a good sense of how many lawsuits have been filed against anti-spyware vendors for classifying third party software as "adware" or "spyware." I've blogged on a few (including Kaspersky, PC Tools and Symantec v. Hotbar), and Ben Edelman maintains a larger catalog of such lawsuits (not sure how up-to-date this is). However, I don't know if these lawsuits are relatively rare (as Ben's chart implies) or if they are multitudinous but most quietly fly under the radar screen.
If there aren't many unpublicized lawsuits, that may reflect that suing an anti-spyware vendor over its classification decisions almost never makes sense. First, many vendors have a private adjudicatory/appellate process that resolves many potential disputes without a lawsuit. Certainly, most vendors don't want to make errors, which undermines their own credibility, and most reputable vendors want to fix their mistakes. Second, lawsuits bring generally unwanted publicity to the plaintiff, calling extra attention to their alleged deficiencies and bringing out all of the gripers. Third, the costs of the lawsuit may be more than the value of any frustrated transactions. Finally, many of the lawsuits have low probabilities of legal success for the reasons I'll discuss in a moment. So there is good reason to believe classification-related lawsuits such as this one are rare. (I'm not saying that grumbles or C&Ds are rare; I'm just referring to formal lawsuits).
In this lawsuit, 7Search says that it was in the toolbar business but stopped offering downloads from its site in 2003. However, McAfee's SiteAdviser gives 7Search the big red X and says "Feedback from credible users suggests that downloads on this site may contain what some people would consider adware, spyware, or other potentially unwanted programs." 7Search claims that this statement is false because it isn't offering any downloads at all. 7Search thus alleges false advertising (Lanham 43(a)), deceptive trade practices, defamation and unfair competition.
The most obvious barrier to 7Search's lawsuit is 47 USC 230. Both (c)(1) and (c)(2) could be implicated. (c)(1) is less likely, but if in fact McAfee is republishing information from third parties (as suggested by the statement's reference to "credible users"), they may be able to claim (c)(1) for the republication. Either way, (c)(2)--the immunization for filtering decisions--is directly on point and potentially immediately fatal to the lawsuit. Zango's lawsuit against Kaspersky was soundly and quickly knocked out on 230(c)(2) grounds (though that is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit), and a district court in Illinois gave broad deference to the Zango ruling in finding that Comcast could claim 230(c)(2) for email filtering decisions.
At the same time, 7Search alleges that McAfee's classifications were in bad faith. If so, then 230(c)(2) wouldn't apply even under the liberal Kaspersky or Comcast approaches, both of which required subjective good faith. We'll have to see how McAfee responds to determine if 7Search's allegation has any chance of getting traction.
There are two other possible holes in the potential 230 coverage for this lawsuit. First, courts have been inconsistent whether a false advertising 43(a) claim under the Lanham Act fits within the "IP" exclusion to 230. Second, most of 7Search's gripe goes to McAfee's statement that bad downloads are available--words chosen by McAfee to describe its filtering decision. It remains unclear if 230(c)(2) protects an intermediary's characterization of its filtering decision as much as it protects the filtering decision itself--just like 230(c)(1) may protect against liability for third party information but may not protect against marketing representations rendered untrue by third party content or actions.
In any case, I think this lawsuit and others over classification decisions raise interesting and important issues that I plan to explore in my Economics of Reputational Information project. We want skillful intermediaries to digest the overwhelming amount of information available in the marketplace and make reputational judgments that speed up our consumer decision-making. On that basis, we definitely don't want reputational judgments removed from marketplace actors and put into the hands of the judges. However, we also want the reputational intermediaries to make factually accurate judgments because their misjudgments also could distort marketplace decision-making.
Posted by Eric at 03:54 PM Permalink | Adware/Spyware , Derivative Liability , Marketing , Trademark | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version
August 26, 2008
Court Slams Competitive Metatagging and Keyword Advertising--Soilworks v. Midwest Industrial Supply
By Eric Goldman
Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 2008 WL 3286975 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2008)
All too frequently, we get an opinion where the judge clearly didn't grasp current implementations of keyword advertising and metatagging. Often, it's simply a bad luck of the draw; in other cases, the defense lawyers may have failed to educate the judge properly (IMO, the Axiom case is an example of the latter).
This opinion, an outgrowth of patent litigation involving two competitors in the soil anti-erosion business, is a good example of a judge who just doesn't get it. The advertiser's misdeed is that it "uses the [trademarked] phrase 'soil sement' in keyword advertising on an Internet search engine and uses variations of the phrase in metatags for its websites." The opinion doesn't specify if the advertiser triggered ads on the term "soil sement" or displayed the trademark in the ad copy, nor does the opinion specify which metatags (keyword, description, others) contained the "soil sement" references.
Those "details" don't matter to this judge, though, because the initial interest confusion doctrine provides a cure-all for any factual or analytical deficiencies. Even though there was zero evidence that the advertiser's behavior actually or might have confused consumers one bit, the court says that the potential for attention diversion from keyword advertising and metatagging was sufficient to constitute initial interest confusion ("the wrong in a metatag initial interest confusion case is ... the diversion of the consumer's initial attention to the defendant's website using the plaintiff's trademark and goodwill"). Unfortunately for the analytical rigor of the judge's discussion, it's already well-established that (1) keyword metatags have no meaningful diversionary power, and (2) as I've explained here, it is impossible to conclude that consumers were diverted until we can confirm where the consumers were trying to go in the first place (and a simple keyword search can't tell us that). (There are plenty more bases to attack the "logic" here; I'm trying to be selective). As a result, this court's reliance on attention diversion concerns is anachronistic at best and pernicious at worst.
This opinion is too inscrutable to draw many useful lessons from it. However, it reinforces a broader lesson that there remains significant legal downside, and minimal marketing upside, to including competitive trademarks in keyword metatags. Therefore, I continue to strongly suggest that advertisers should avoid this practice.
For more, see Rebecca's commentary, where she says she's "depressed" by rulings like this.
Posted by Eric at 09:57 AM Permalink | Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version
August 21, 2008
Fair Use - It's the Law (for what it's worth)--Lenz v. Universal
DMCA notice & takedown provisions upheld in Lenz v. Universal
By Ethan Ackerman
A recent ruling in Lenz v. Universal shows just how far being right about something can get you - barely past a motion to dismiss. It just may force a bit of change, too.
Wednesday's ruling in Lenz v. Universal is being characterized by most press coverage as "requiring copyright owners to consider the fair use doctrine before issuing takedown notices." For most purposes, that's an accurate summary of the ruling.
The statute requires it, right?
What the court gets right in Lenz is its conclusion that the statute means what it says. More specifically, Lenz upheld the statutory requirement that a notifier have a "good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by ... law, as stated in 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A). One of Lenz's core claims in the case was that her use of Universal's music was a fair use, and thus "authorized by law." The fact that it was authorized by the fair use provision of copyright law made Universal's assertion otherwise a misrepresentation, Lenz contended.
Judge Jeremy Fogel agreed, holding that "an activity or behavior 'authorized by law' is one permitted by law or not contrary to law" and since "fair use is a lawful use of a copyright,...in order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with 'a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,' the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright."
Faced with such clear statutory language, Judge Fogel found Universal's arguments, roughly that 'fair use is hard to figure out' and 'fair use isn't really law so much as an exception to the law,' were lacking.
So how's this not a win for Lenz?
While the opinion so far seems a pretty cut-and-dried win for Lenz (and her attorneys at the EFF,) Judge Fogel looks to the next step of this litigation and points out that being right on the law isn't enough. There are facts that must be proven too. In a complex judicial process called 'telegraphing an opinion and dropping hints,' Judge Fogel states that "the Court has considerable doubt that Lenz will be able to prove that Universal acted with the subjective bad faith required...."
These DMCA notice provisions are a two-edged sword, and 9th Circuit precedent has further narrowed the provisions such that the other edge is sharp indeed. The notice provision requiring a "belief" that the post isn't authorized by the owner or the law merely requires that the notifier have a "good faith belief," not a legal certainty. Additionally, Judge Fogel points out under a prior case, Rossi v. MPAA, that "subjective bad faith" must be shown to disprove good faith. In other words, Lenz has to show that Universal (roughly) knew, or possibly should have known, the use was fair and sent the notice anyway. While EFF has made a point of lining up an impressive array of facts that may push this particular case over the edge, bearing the evidentiary burden of proving the actions and intentions of an adversary is a heavy burden indeed.
But wait, what if this letter wasn't even under the statute?
Another unsettled issue in this case may pop up on appeal or in similar cases. As detailed above, Lenz came out this particular way because the judge followed the clear wording of the DMCA provisions. An unaddressed part of Universal's argument, and one likely to pop up again in similar cases or possibly on appeal, seems like it may well moot this holding. Universal argued (albeit just in a footnote) that the DMCA statute didn't apply from the get-go because Universal didn't send a DMCA notice. Universal argued that it shouldn't be held to the particulars and penalties of the DMCA because its letter to YouTube wasn't a DMCA notice, just a request letter.
Judge Fogel's order simply doesn't address this argument. It's a good one (or a particularly bad one, depending on one's view) too, especially in light of other recent litigation developments and the procedural history of the DMCA notice provisions. These DMCA provisions make up a regime for take-down notices and copyright safe harbors, but they likely aren't the only regime in town.
Even before the DMCA was enacted, an ISP was often not liable for the infringements of its users. Similarly, pre-DMCA a content owner could ask that an ISP remove content via a nice (or not) letter to the ISP. The DMCA legislation created a structured system to give more legal certainty in this area, but it is likely not the exclusive way in which content owners can notify ISPs - at the very least no court, including Lenz, has yet said it's the exclusive way.
The Lenz judge treated Universal's letter as a DMCA notice, even though it said on its face it wasn't. A good argument could be made on the facts of this case that it had to be treated as one, but that may not always be the case. Content owners increasingly seem to be making similar claims outside of the DMCA process, or even arguing that DMCA safe-harbor compliance isn't enough, and at some point a court might well accept such an argument.
[Eric's addition: I think Ethan is onto something regarding the types of takedown notices that trigger 512(f). For example, would an inappropriate NOCI under the eBay VeRO program be governed by 512(f)? This issue was sidestepped in prior litigation over 512(f) and eBay NOCIs. See Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment. However, in the future, as Ethan points out, 512(f) defendants might claim that their C&D or other takedown request wasn't made under 512(c)(3) to try to escape liability under 512(f).]
Posted by Ethan Ackerman at 03:45 PM Permalink | Copyright | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version
August 20, 2008
Competitive Pop-up Ads Aren't Unfair Competition or Tortious Interference--Overstock v. SmartBargains
By Eric Goldman
Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55 (Utah Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 2008)
In light of the death of adware and the fact that almost all of us have moved on, it is jarring to see adware opinions still emerging. This case, percolating in the courts four years, is quite a throwback.
In 2004, Overstock sued SmartBargains for buying adware-delivered pop-up ads that were triggered by user visits to Overstock.com. There have been a lot of keyword advertising cases since then, but this case is unusual because (for reasons not clear to me) Overstock did not make the more typical trademark infringement claim or even the less common trademark dilution claim.
Instead, Overstock asserted three causes of action: (1) violation of the initial Utah Spyware Control Act passed in 2004, (2) unfair competition, and (3) tortious interference with prospective business relations. The Spyware Control Act claim was mooted when the statute was deemed unconstitutional and further mooted when the legislature amended the law, so Overstock did not pursue that claim further. The district court also ruled against Overstock on the other 2, and Overstock appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. [for reasons that aren't clear to me, this case apparently bypassed the Utah appeals court.]
The Supreme Court had little difficulty disposing of the remaining claims. The pop-up ads didn't constitute unfair competition (in Utah, an anti-passing off claim) in this case because SmartBargains' pop-ups appeared in a separate window and displayed the SmartBargains' logo. The tortious interference claim gets tossed for exactly the right reason--competitive ads are a good thing, not bad. The court says "SmartBargains’ pop-ups indisputably exist to compete with Overstock. Competition is not an improper purpose, even though other byproducts of competition may exist." Case dismissed.
In one sense, this case isn't all that important. With respect to lawsuits over competitive online ads, most of the action relates to trademark infringement and particularly what constitutes a trademark use in commerce. But this case is important because it's fairly typical for plaintiffs in those lawsuits to add a laundry list of additional claims with the hope that something sticks. As this case shows, the laundry list claims are junky and easily disposed of, and a state supreme court ruling to that effect is a nice and useful precedent for defendants.
Even so, I wonder about the political ramifications of this ruling. Overstock's attitude towards keyword advertising has been erratic. On the one hand, it went to the Utah legislature to protest the Utah Trademark Protection Act because it apparently buys keyword ads on third party trademarks. On the other hand, it supported Utah's initial Spyware Control Act, it was the first to try to take advantage of the law, and it was willing to pursue this silly lawsuit for over 4 years. In response to this loss, will Overstock flip--just like its Utah Internet retailing peer 1-800 Contacts flipped--and go seek out a friendly and easily persuaded Utah state legislator to give it a tailor-made anti-keyword advertising statute? Stranger things have happened in Utah...
HT: Evan Brown
Posted by Eric at 07:15 AM Permalink | Adware/Spyware , Marketing , Trademark | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version
August 19, 2008
State of the Net West 2008 Recap
By Eric Goldman
Earlier this month, the High Tech Law Institute co-sponsored "State of the Net West," an event designed to facilitate a conversation between DC policy makers and Silicon Valley technology folks. We had a terrific turnout (especially given that we held it during peak vacation season) and some stimulating conversation. We recorded the discussion, so take a listen [these are at iTunesU, so you need the iTunes client to access them]:
* Welcome and Panel 1 on reputation, anonymity and social networking
* Panel 2 on 47 USC 230. See Larry Magid's writeup of this panel.
* Panel 3 on cloud computing and the privacy of remotely stored information. See a writeup of this panel.
Some interesting tidbits from the day:
* Rep. Goodlatte's son now works at Facebook
* Rep. Lofgren called the Roommates.com decision a "real stretch"
* Michael Fertik said that it only takes 20 minutes to ruin someone's reputation online while it can take 20-200 hours to repair the damage
* there was some discussion about ways that copyright law attempts to protect individual privacy. Copyright law wasn't designed to do that, so it functions poorly in that regard (and probably others). If you're looking for a paper topic, there may be some merit to exploring copyright's role as a privacy protection tool.
Posted by Eric at 06:10 PM Permalink | General | TrackBack (0) | Printable Version